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PROLOGUE'
One morning in early spring, a five-time convicted rapist is released from
prison after serving time on his most recent conviction. Word from his
cellmate is that he shows no remorse and is determined to rape again. The
prosecutors and corrections officials familiar with his record attempt to
keep him confined by civilly committing him to a psychiatric facility.
However, under the civil commitment laws in his state, he can only be
involuntarily committed upon proof of a recent overt act showing that he
is a danger to himself or others. Since he has been incarcerated for the
past several years, such proof cannot be obtained. The community to
which he relocates is notified of his presence and his record. Although they
are frightened and angry, no legal recourse exists. He has served his time
and is now free.
Three months after his release, he rapes again. The community is
outraged and demands a solution to the problem of sexual offenders.
Many alternatives are proposed:
"They should all go to prison for life, no questions asked!"
"How about a two-strikes law for all sexual offenders-as soon as they are
convicted for a second time they automatically get life in prison."
* B.A., 1990, University of Washington; J.D. Candidate 1997, Seattle University School of
Law. I would like to thank Sarah Sappington, Sarah Coats and Jan Capps for their invaluable
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1. The following scenario and dialogue were created by the author to illustrate the debate
over sexually violent predator statutes.
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"Wait a minute, not every sex offender is like him. What if they make
one mistake and really learn from it-life in prison is a bit harsh for that,
don't you think?"
"You're too soft. These guys are sick and shouldn't ever get out."
"Not all of them are sick. Maybe we can find a way to figure out which
ones are sick and dangerous and keep them locked up until they can be
treated."
"You can't treat these guys. Just put them in prison and you don't have
to worry about them anymore."
"Sentencing all sex offenders to prison for life is pretty expensive. Do we
want to pay for that when we might be able to treat them?"
"Okay, so we only keep some of them in prison for life, the really bad
ones.
"How do we decide which ones are bad-not all rapists will rape again,
right?"
"I don't know. I just know that this problem is out of control and we have
to do something."
I. INTRODUCTION
The option chosen by the State of Washington for dealing with
the dilemma of violent sex offenders was the enactment, in 1990, of the
Sexually Violent Predators (SVP) statute.2 Since its enactment, the
SVP statute has met with both criticism and support, been the subject
of differing constitutional interpretations from the Washington State
Supreme Court' and the federal district court, 4 and been under
intense public scrutiny from legal and psychiatric professionals as well
as the community at large.
This Comment argues that the SVP statute is not only constitu-
tionally sound, but is also the best alternative for the problem of
sexually violent predators. Part II describes the SVP statute and how
2. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010-71.09.902 (1994).
3. In re Detention of Andre Brigham Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P.2d 989 (1993).
4. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) [hereinafter Young v. Weston
to avoid confusion with In re Young].
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it came to be enacted. Next, in examining the constitutionality of the
statute, Part III briefly describes the decision rendered by the
Washington Supreme Court in 1993 which upheld the SVP statute, as
well as the federal district court's 1995 ruling, which held the statute
to be unconstitutional. In arguing that the statute is constitutional,
Part IV addresses and refutes the arguments made by the federal
district court. Lastly, Part V looks at the alternative solutions available
for the problem of sexually violent predators, and argues that neither
mandatory life sentences nor an expansion of the current civil
commitment system is the proper answer to this dilemma.
In 1994, the State of Kansas enacted a sexually violent predator
law that is almost identical to Washington's SVP statute.5 In March
1996, the Kansas Supreme Court held the law to be unconstitutional6
and the ruling is currently on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.7 Although this Comment will not address the Kansas sexually
violent predator law, because the Washington and Kansas laws are
almost identical, any ruling by the United States Supreme Court as to
the constitutionality of the Kansas SVP law will also determine the
constitutionality of the Washington SVP statute. By closely examining
how the courts have handled Washington's SVP statute, this Comment
will argue that such laws are constitutional and should be upheld by
any court, including the United States Supreme Court.
II. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTE
A. Background
On May 20, 1989, a seven-year-old boy riding his bike to a
friend's house was raped and mutilated by Earl Shriner.8 Shriner had
a twenty-four-year history of criminal assaults and had been released
from prison two years earlier after serving a ten-year term for two
violent sex crimes.' At the time Shriner was released, some had
predicted he was still very dangerous and had petitioned unsuccessfully
to have him civilly committed.' 0 The community was outraged that
5. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29A (1994).
6. In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Leroy Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996).
7. Kansas v. Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (June 17,
1996) (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075).
8. David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 525, 526 (1992) (quoting Past Sex Offender Suspect in Attack - Boy Too Traumatized to
Cry by Mutilation, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, May 22, 1989 at Al).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 527 (citing System Just Couldn't Keep Suspect, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, May 23,
1989 at AS. State officials had sought to have Shriner civilly committed in 1987 when he was
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a man who was a known threat to children could have been out on the
streets and able to cause harm again." Protesters gathered on the
steps of the Capitol Building in Olympia and demanded that the
Governor call a special session of the legislature to enact tougher
penalties for sex offenders, including life imprisonment for repeat sex
offenders. 12  On June 15, 1989, the Governor acted: By executive
order, he created The Governor's Task Force on Community
Protection. 3 The job of the Task Force was to review the current
criminal justice system and the mental health civil involuntary
commitment process and determine its effectiveness in dealing with
individuals who are not safe to be at large in the community. 4
The Task Force considered many different alternatives for dealing
with sexually violent predators such as Earl Shriner, ranging from
expansion of the existing involuntary civil commitment system to
mandatory life sentences for repeat offenders." The system had been
unable to civilly commit Earl Shriner because the professionals who
made the evaluations for such commitment typically interpreted the"mental illness" definition narrowly, rather than using the term as
broadly as the statute allows. 6 Earl Shriner did not fit the more
narrow definition and subsequently fell through the cracks. The task
force considered broadening the existing civil commitment standards
so that sexual predators would clearly be covered by the civil commit-
ment statute. However, this alternative was ultimately rejected because
it would require such drastic changes to the existing civil commitment
released from prison after serving the "full 10 year sentence for assaulting and abducting two 16-
year-old girls." The story revealed that Washington's Parole Board had denied all requests to
release Shriner on parole. In addition, it reported that state officials had sought civil commitment
when Shriner completed his prison term because he "had hatched elaborate plans to maim or kill
youngsters while waiting out the final months of his prison sentence in early 1987 .... ").
11. See Boerner, supra note 8, at 527-538 (describing content of newspaper articles and
public outcry).
12. Id. at 534.
13. Id. at 538. The Task Force consisted of 24 members, including professionals in the
criminal justice system, legislators, treatment professionals, academics, and three representatives
of victims, including the mother of the seven-year-old boy victimized by Earl Shriner. Id.
14. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 89-04, Wash. St. Reg. 89-13-055 (1989)). Other
responsibilities included assessing the relationship between these criminal and mental health
systems to identify the shortcomings; researching the feasibility of creating a specialized, secure
facility for certain categories of people who represent the most risk to society; and considering
research and approaches to enhancing our ability to accurately predict future behavior of
individuals who have committed or who have threatened to commit violent criminal acts and
establish legal criteria for confining them. Id.
15. Id. at 547-549. See infra Part V for further discussion of these alternatives.
16. Id. at 543 n.17.
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law that it would no longer be effective for handling the short-term
confinees who were currently committed under that law. 7
The Task Force also considered and rejected mandatory life
sentences for repeat sex offenders. While all members of the Task
Force agreed that those who commit the most serious sex offenses
deserved very long sentences, not all members agreed that every sex
offender deserved such an exceptional sentence."
After several months of intense work, the Task Force proposed
the SVP statute. The statute was enacted by the Legislature in
1990.19
B. The SVP Statute
The SVP statute allows the state to involuntarily civilly commit"sexually violent predators,"" until the individual's mental abnormal-
ity or personality disorder has so changed that the individual is not
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if conditionally
released to a less restrictive environment or unconditionally dis-
charged.2' In order to be deemed a "sexually violent predator," an
individual must (1) have been convicted of or charged22 with a crime
of sexual violence, and (2) suffer from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts
of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.23
Under the SVP statute, when a person who at any time previously
has been convicted of a sexually violent offense24 is about to be
17. Id. at 550. See also discussion infra Part V.
18. Id. at 549. See also discussion infra Part V.
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09 (1994). The statute was amended in the 1995 legislative
session to clarify requirements as well as add a conditional release component, which provides for
a less restrictive alternative to total confinement before unconditionally discharging residents back
into the community. 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 216, § 1.
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (1994).
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090 (Supp. 1995). The 1995 amendment replaced "if
released" with "if conditionally released to a less restrictive alternative or unconditionally
discharged." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(1) (Supp. 1995).
22. This includes individuals who were charged with a sexually violent offense and
determined to be incompetent to stand trial pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(3)
(1994); or individuals charged with an offense but found not guilty by reason of insanity of a
sexually violent offense pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020(3). WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.09.030 (1994).
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1995). The 1995 amendment added the
language "if not confined in a secure facility." 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 216, § 1.
24. A "sexually violent offense" means:
(a) An act defined in Title 9A RCW as rape in the first degree, rape in the second
degree by forcible compulsion, rape of a child in the first or second degree, statutory
rape in the first or second degree, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion, indecent
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released from total confinement, the prosecuting attorney of the county
where the person was convicted (or the attorney general if requested by
the prosecuting attorney) may file a petition alleging that the person is
a sexually violent predator." A probable cause hearing is then
held.26 The individual is entitled to notice and the right to be present
at the hearing.27 If the court determines that probable cause exists,
the judge directs that the individual be transferred to an appropriate
facility for an evaluation to determine if the person is a sexually violent
predator.28
Within forty-five days of the filing of the petition by the
prosecuting attorney, a trial is conducted in which a jury must
unanimously decide beyond a reasonable doubt whether the individual
is a sexually violent predator. 29  The individual is entitled to assis-
tance of counsel3" at this trial and may retain experts and health
liberties against a child under age fourteen, incest against a child under age fourteen, or
child molestation in the first or second degree; (b) a felony offense that is comparable
to a sexually violent offense as defined in (a) of this subsection, or any federal or out-of-
state conviction for a felony offense that under the laws of this state would be a sexually
violent offense as defined in this subsection; (c) an act of murder in the first or second
degree, assault in the first or second degree, burglary in the first degree, residential
burglary, or unlawful imprisonment, which act, either at the time of sentencing for the
offense or subsequently during civil commitment proceedings pursuant to chapter 71.09
RCW, has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated;
... or (d) an act as described in chapter 9A.28 RCW that is an attempt, criminal
solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit one of the felonies designated in (a), (b),
or (c).
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(6) (Supp. 1995).
25. The statute also applies to (1) a person who is about to be released from confinement
and who committed a sexually violent offense as a juvenile, (2) a person who has been charged
with a sexually violent offense and has been determined to be incompetent to stand trial and is
about to be released, (3) a person who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity of a
sexually violent offense and is about to be released, and (4) a person who at any time previously
has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and has since been released from total
confinement and has committed a recent overt act. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (1994).
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.040 (Supp. 1995).
27. Id. At the probable cause hearing, the individual has the following rights: (a) to be
represented by counsel; (b) to present evidence on his or her behalf; (c) to cross-examine witnesses
who testify against him or her; and (d) to view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.040(3) (Supp. 1995).
28. Id. The examination shall be conducted by a person deemed to be professionally
qualified to conduct such an examination pursuant to rules developed by the department of social
and health services. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.040(4) (Supp. 1995).
29. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.040-71.09.060 (Supp. 1995). The individual, the
prosecutor, or attorney general may demand a trial before a 12-person jury. If not demanded, the
trial will be before the court.
30. If indigent, counsel will be appointed. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.050 (1994).
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professionals to perform an examination on his or her behalf.3M If the
jury determines that the individual is a sexually violent predator, he or
she is committed to the custody of the Department of Social and
Health Services for placement in a secure facility for control, care, and
treatment. The individual is held until such time as his mental
abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that he is safe to
either be at large or to be conditionally released to a less restrictive
environment.32
Each individual committed has a yearly examination of his or her
mental condition to determine whether conditional release to a less
restrictive environment is in the best interest of both the person
committed and the community.3 3  Any person committed under the
SVP statute has the right to adequate care and individualized treat-
ment.34 If the Secretary of the Department of Social and Health
Services determines that the individual's mental abnormality or
personality disorder has so changed that the person is not likely to
engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, the Secretary will authorize
the person to petition the court for either conditional release or
unconditional discharge." A hearing will be held, before a jury if
demanded, or before the court, and the burden is on the prosecuting
attorney to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is still
31. Id. When the individual wishes to be examined by a qualified expert or professional
person of his or her own choice, the examiner is permitted to have reasonable access to the person
for the purpose of the examination, as well as to all relevant medical and psychological records
and reports. Id.
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060 (1994). "Less restrictive alternative" means "court-
ordered treatment in a setting less restrictive than total confinement." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.09.020(7) (Supp. 1995).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.070 (Supp. 1995). The annual report shall include
consideration of whether conditional release to a less restrictive alternative is in the best interest
of the person and will adequately protect the community. Just as at trial, the individual has a
right to be examined by an expert on the individual's behalf. See supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080(2) (Supp. 1995).
The department of social and health services shall keep records detailing all medical,
expert and professional care and treatment received by a committed person. All such
records and reports shall be made available only to: The committed person, his or her
attorney, the prosecuting attorney, the court, the protection and advocacy agency, or
another expert or professional person who, upon proper showing, demonstrates a need
for access.
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 71,09.090(1) (1994).
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not safe to be at large.36 The individual may also petition the court
for release without the Secretary's authorization.3 7
As a result of the unique character of the SVP statute, which
allows civil commitment of sexually violent predators after the
completion of a prison term, the constitutionality of the statute has
been attacked.3" The grounds most often cited are that the statute is
a violation of substantive due process requirements, as well as the Ex
Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution.39 Both
the Washington Supreme Court and the federal district court have
ruled on the statute's constitutionality. The supreme court upheld the
statute as constitutional,4 ° while the federal district court deemed it
unconstitutional.4'
36. Id.
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(2) (1994).
The secretary shall provide the committed person with an annual written notice of the
person's right to petition the court for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative
or unconditional discharge over the secretary's objection .... If the person does not
affirmatively waive the right to petition, the court shall set a show cause hearing to
determine whether facts exist to warrant a hearing on whether the person's condition has
so changed that he or she is safe to be at large.. .. The committed person shall have
a right to have an attorney represent him or her at the show cause hearing but the
person is not entitled to be present himself at the show cause hearing. If the court, at
the show cause hearing, determines that probable cause exists to believe that the
person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is
not likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if conditionally released to a less
restrictive alternative or unconditionally discharged, then the court shall set a hearing
on the issue.
Id. The hearing will be held before a jury, if demanded, or before the court, and the burden is
on the prosecuting attorney to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is still not safe
to be at large. Id.
38. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P.2d 989; Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744.
39. Id. Another constitutional argument raised regarding the SVP statute is that it contains
procedural due process problems. This argument was rejected by the Washington Supreme
Court. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 42, 857 P.2d at 1009. In addition, the dissent in In re
Young raised equal protection problems with the recent overt act distinction between incarcerated
and noncarcerated individuals. Id. at 26, 857 P.2d 1022-23 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Because the
federal district court found the statute unconstitutional in only three areas-substantive due
process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto-this Comment will focus on rebutting those three
areas and will not address any other constitutional arguments.
40. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P.2d 989.
41. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744. An appeal of the district court decision is currently
pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D.
Wash. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-35958 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 1995).
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III. THE DIFFERING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS BY
THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS42
A. General Constitutional Principles
In both the Washington Supreme Court and federal district court
decisions, the constitutionality of the SVP statute was analyzed under
substantive due process, ex post facto, and double jeopardy.43 Under
substantive due process analysis, when a state law impinges on a
fundamental right, the law is constitutional only if it furthers a
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that inter-
est.44 The state has a compelling interest in treating sex predators
and protecting society from their actions.45 That interest may be
served by civil commitment if a person is both mentally ill and
dangerous.46
The decisions also examined the ex post facto and double jeopardy
challenges to the SVP statute. Article I of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that the states may not pass any ex post facto law.47 An
ex post facto law is "every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime when
committed."4  The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
protects against two prosecutions for the same offense and multiple
punishments for the same offense.49 A statute can only violate the
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution if (1)
it is a criminal statute, or (2) if it is a civil statute, its impact renders
it more punitive than civil.5°
B. Washington Supreme Court
In 1991, two individuals committed under the SVP statute
appealed their convictions as sexually violent predators to the Supreme
42. Although the constitutional arguments addressed by the courts will be briefly mentioned
here, a more in-depth analysis can be found in Part III, infra.
43. See In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P.2d 989; Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744.
44. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 26, 857 P.2d at 1000; Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at
748 (citing State v. Farmer, 116 Wash. 2d 414, 429, 805 P.2d 200, 812 P.2d 858 (1991); In re
Schuoler, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986)).
45. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 26, 857 P.2d at 1000.
46. Id. at 27, 857 P.2d at 1001; Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 749.
47. U.S. CONST. ART. I § 10.
48. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Wall.) 386, 390 (1798).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
50. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 18, 857 P.2d at 996.
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Court of Washington,"5 claiming that the statute violated substantive
due process as well as the ex post facto and double jeopardy prohibi-
tions. The supreme court upheld the statute as constitutional and
affirmed the conviction of one of the petitioners.5 3
Applying the substantive due process test, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that because the SVP statute requires proof of a
mental abnormality or personality disorder, as well as dangerousness
before an individual can be committed, it passed constitutional
muster. 54
The court also examined the ex post facto and double jeopardy
claims. In examining the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute,
the court considered the language of the statute as well as the
legislative history and determined that the Legislature intended the
SVP statute to be civil in nature.5 To examine the impact of the
statute, the court looked at whether its punitive characteristics negated
the civil intent of the Legislature. 6
First, the court compared Washington's SVP statute to a similar
SVP statute in Illinois that was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to be
civil in nature. 7 Next, the Court examined the Washington SVP
statute using the factors laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court for
determining whether a statute is civil or punitive: (1) whether the
sanction involves affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it
historically has been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes
into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will
promote traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence;
(5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6)
51. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 14-17, 857 P.2d at 994-996. The criminal history of one
of the petitioners included convictions for six violent felony rapes and one violent attempted rape
of adult female strangers. Two of the rapes were committed in the presence of the victims'
children. The attempted rape occurred while petitioner was free on an appeal bond for previous
rape convictions. The criminal history of the second petitioner included convictions for three
rapes of adult female strangers. One of the rapes occurred only three months after his release
from prison for a previous rape conviction. Id.
52. Id. at 10, 857 P.2d at 992.
53. Id. Although upholding the statute as constitutional, the court did find that if an
individual was committed under the statute after having been released into the community, the
state was required to show proof of a recent overt act in order to commit the individual. Id. at
41, 857 P.2d at 1009. Since one of the petitioners had been released into the community and the
state had not shown proof of a recent overt act, his conviction was reversed. Id. The SVP statute
has since been amended to specifically require proof of a recent overt act if an individual has been
released into the community. 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 216, § 6.
54. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 42, 857 P.2d at 1009.
55. Id. at 19, 857 P.2d at 996-997.
56. Id. at 19-20, 857 P.2d at 996-997.
57. Id. at 20-21, 857 P.2d at 997 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986)).
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whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned.5" The Washington State Supreme
Court held that the SVP statute was civil because, notwithstanding an
affirmative restraint, the civil commitment goals of incapacitation and
treatment are distinct from punishment and have been so regarded
historically.5 9 In addition, no finding of scienter is necessary to
commit a sexually violent predator; the determination is based on a
mental abnormality or personality disorder rather than on one's
culpability.60 Therefore, the court held that the statute did not violate
either the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution.61
C. United States District Court
The petitioner who was unsuccessful in his state Supreme Court
bid next filed an action in federal district court challenging the legality
of his detention on the same constitutional grounds raised at the state
level.62 The federal district court found the statute unconstitutional
because it violated substantive due process, as well as the ex post facto
and double jeopardy prohibitions.63
In contrast to the Washington State Supreme Court, the federal
district court found that the SVP statute was missing the "mental
illness" component and therefore civil commitment was constitutionally
impermissible.64 The court held that the "mental abnormality" or"personality disorder" language of the SVP statute was inadequate to
meet the standard required for civil commitment-mentally ill and
dangerous-and, therefore, the statute violated substantive due
process. 65
58. Id. at 21-22, 857 P.2d at 998-999 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 22, 857 P.2d at 998.
61. Id. at 23, 857 P.2d at 999.
62. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744.
63. Id. at 754.
64. Id. at 749.
65. Id. at 750. The court essentially adopted the reasoning of the Washington State
Psychiatric Association as expressed in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the petitioner arguing
that the term "mental abnormality" as used in the SVP statute has no clinically recognized
meaning nor recognized diagnostic use among treatment professionals. Id. at 750; Amicus Brief
submitted by the Washington State Psychiatric Association on Behalf of Petitioner at 5-7, Young
v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (No. C94-480C) [hereinafter WSPA Brief).
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Using the same analytical factors as used by the Washington State
Supreme Court, the federal district court found that the SVP statute
subjects individuals to affirmative restraint, applies to behavior that is
already a crime, and promotes the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence.66  Therefore, the court held the
statute to be fundamentally criminal in impact.67 As a criminal
statute, the federal district court held that the law was punishing
individuals twice for the same crime (double jeopardy) and inflicting
a greater punishment to the crime than was attached to the crime when
initially committed (ex post facto).6" A close examination of the
federal district court's findings, however, will show that the court's
analysis was flawed.
IV. WASHINGTON'S SVP STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL
A. Substantive Due Process Requirements
The Constitution of the United States requires that a person shall
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.69 The liberty interest of an individual is fundamental and
important.7 Whenever a state law impinges on a fundamental right,
such as liberty, it is invalid unless it furthers a compelling state interest
and is narrowly drawn to serve those interests.7 It is "irrefutable that
the state has a compelling interest both in treating sex predators and
protecting society from their actions."72 The United States Supreme
Court has held that a "state has a legitimate interest under its parens
patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because
of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has
authority under its police power to protect the community from the
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill." 73 This reasoning
66. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 752.
67. Id. at 752-53.
68. Id. at 753-754.
69. U.S. CONST. amends. 5, 14; U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 3.
70. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 738, 750 (1987).
71. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 26, 857 P.2d at 1000 (citing State v. Farmer, 116 Wash.
2d 414, 429, 805 P.2d 200, 812 P.2d 858 (1991); In re Schuoler, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986)).
72. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 26, 857 P.2d at 1000 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 426 (1979); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980)). Addington involved an indefinite
commitment in which the Court held that the proper standard of proof for civil commitment was
greater than a preponderance of the evidence standard but not as high as beyond a reasonable
doubt. Addington, 441 U.S. 418.
73. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
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was reiterated in Foucha v. Louisiana,74 which held that a person may
be confined if the state shows "by clear and convincing evidence that
the individual is mentally ill and dangerous."
Under the rules set forth in Addington v. Texas and Foucha, a state
law that deprives a person of liberty only furthers a compelling state
interest if it is designed to civilly commit individuals who are both
mentally ill and dangerous. The SVP statute does not use the term"mentally ill," but instead requires that an individual suffer from a"mental abnormality" or "personality disorder."75 It is this seeming
discrepancy in characterization that has engendered controversy in the
debate over the constitutionality of the SVP statute.
The federal district court found that the "essential component
missing from the Sexually Violent Predator Statute is the requirement
that the detainee be mentally ill. ' 76 The court held that by using the
terms mental abnormality and personality disorder, rather than
mentally ill, the SVP statute allowed for the civil commitment of
individuals "based on little more than a showing of potential future
dangerousness."77  The court further held that the term mental
abnormality has neither a clinically significant meaning nor a recog-
nized diagnostic use among treatment professionals.78 These argu-
ments are flawed in several respects.
First, the SVP statute does not base commitment "on little more
than a showing of potential future dangerousness" because it only
allows for the civil commitment of a narrow group of mentally
disordered sex offenders whose mental conditions make them likely to
commit predatory acts of sexual violence. The argument that mental
abnormality does not have a clinically significant meaning misconstrues
the question before the court. The question is not whether the term
mental abnormality has a specific clinical definition, as can be found
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the
American Psychiatric Association,79  but whether the statutory
74. 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). Foucha involved a Louisiana statute requiring that an individual
found not guilty by reason of insanity be committed to a psychiatric hospital unless he proves he
is not dangerous. The Court held the law unconstitutional because it contained no mental illness
requirement. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 71.
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (1994).
76. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 749.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 750.
79. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric
Association (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. The DSM-JV is
a classification of mental disorders that was developed for use in clinical, educational,
and research settings.. . . The specific diagnostic criteria included in the DSM-IV are
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definition has meaning to those mental health professionals who are
called upon to employ and interpret the term so that these profes-
sionals can identify specific mental disorders that can be fairly said to
predispose an individual to sexually violent predatory acts. 0 The
statutory definition of mental abnormality does have such meaning and
in fact incorporates recognized sexual pathologies that are found in the
DSM-IV and can be used by experts who are asked to evaluate such
pathologies.81
The second flaw in the district court's holding is that the terms
mentally ill and mentally disordered have consistently been used
synonymously by the U.S. Supreme Court and by state courts in
statutory schemes for civil commitment.8 2
Third, the purpose behind the long-standing requirement that an
individual have a mental illness or mental disorder before a state can
civilly commit that individual is to prevent the state from exercising its
power too broadly and taking away the liberty of individuals before
there is a demonstrated need to do so.3 The SVP statute prevents an
over-broad exercise of state power by allowing only the commitment
of individuals who meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator as
defined by the statute.
Lastly, the SVP statute meets the standard for civil commitment
as required by the U.S. Supreme Court in Foucha. These four
analytical flaws in the district court's ruling are discussed below.
meant to serve as guidelines and are not meant to be used in a cookbook fashion. For
example, the exercise of clinical judgment may justify giving a certain diagnosis to an
individual even though the clinical presentation falls just short of meeting the full
criteria for the diagnosis as long as the symptoms that are present are persistent and
severe.
DSM-IV at xxiii.
80. Amicus Brief submitted by the Washington Association for the Treatment of Sexual
Abusers/Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers at 3, Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp.
744 (W.D. Wash. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-35958 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 1995) [hereinafter
WATSA Brief]. The Washington Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (WATSA)
and the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ATSA) submitted an amicus brief to
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on behalf of the State in the appeal of Young v. Weston.
WATSA concluded that Washington's SVP statute uses terms and definitions which, when
applied, have meaning to mental health professionals in the field of the assessment and treatment
of sex offenders. WATSA Brief at 3, 11.
81. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
82. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
83. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26.
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1. "Mental Abnormality" and "Personality Disorder" Have
Meaning to Experts in the Evaluation and Treatment
of Sex Offenders
In finding that the SVP statute was missing the mental illness
component, the federal district court held that the term mental
abnormality has "neither a clinically significant meaning nor a
recognized diagnostic use," is "unrecognized in the psychiatric
community," and is of "no value to treatment professionals."84 These
arguments are incorrect. Although mental abnormality has no clinical
definition in the DSM-IV, the term is not "unrecognized" in the
mental health community and, in fact, can be frequently and common-
ly found in mental health law."5 The term mental abnormality is
recognized by treatment professionals when given a further, specific
context.8 6 Even well-accepted terms such as mental disorder and
mental illness are not meaningful if not given context.87 No mental
health professional would, for example, report or testify simply that a
particular individual is mentally disordered or mentally ill. Such
testimony would be too vague or conclusory8s
Therefore, the question is not whether mental abnormality has a
clinical definition but whether mental health professionals specifically
trained in the identification and diagnosis of sexual pathologies are able
to identify specific mental disorders which can fairly be said to
predispose the individual to commit sexual offenses.89  Mental
abnormality is defined in the SVP statute as "a congenital or acquired
84. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 750.
85. WATSA Brief at 7; see also Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 136 (1952) (spent several
years in institution because of mental abnormality); Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Hale, 230 So.
2d 526, 528 (Ala. 1970) ("stated his wife's mental abnormality had existed for five years ... the
same diagnosis of mental disability was made by staff at Bryce Hospital"); People v. Smith, 486
P.2d 1213, 1216 (Cal. 1971) ("on question of whether he was dangerous to public because of a
mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality"); People v. Hernandez, 196 Cal. Rptr 31,
33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("If after a full hearing the court is of the opinion that discharge of the
person would be physically dangerous to the public because of his mental or physical deficiency,
disorder, or abnormality"); Dower v. Director, Patuxent, 396 F. Supp. 1070, 1081 (D.C. Md.
1975) ("that his release would be dangerous to public because of his mental or physical deficiency,
disorder or abnormality"); State v. Ward, 369 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Minn. 1985) ("dangerous to
public because of his mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality").
86. WATSA Brief at 8 ("Thus, the term 'mental abnormality,' when placed within the
context of sexual disorders, can be clearly understood to describe and include certain severe sexual
pathologies which are recognized and accepted in the field.").
87. Id.
88. Id. Rather, "[t]he report or testimony would have to be in terms of a specific
diagnosis." Id.
89. Id. at 3.
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condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predis-
poses the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of oth-
ers. "90 This definition has very specific meaning to clinicians
experienced in the evaluation and treatment of sexual offenders and is
understood to encompass certain severe forms of paraphilia or sexual
disorders that are found in the DSM-IV. 91
Paraphilias, as defined in the DSM-IV, are characterized by
recurrent, intense, sexually-arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors which generally involve (1) nonhuman subjects; (2) the
suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner; or (3) children or
other nonconsenting persons.9 2 These criteria eliminate the one-time
or "situational" offender, and ensure the presence of a chronic
condition.93 Not all deviant behaviors can be classified as paraphilias,
nor do all sexual offenses have their roots in sexual pathology.94
Further, not all paraphilias constitute mental abnormalities as defined
in the SVP statute. However, three specific forms of paraphilia are
described by and encompassed within that term's definition: pedo-
philia,9 5 sexual sadism,96 and paraphilia not otherwise specified:
rape.97 Although rape is not specifically included in the DSM-IV,
even experts brought by the petitioner in federal court agreed that rape
is a paraphilia.98
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (1994).
91. WATSA Brief at 4.
92. Id. (citing DSM-IV at 522-23).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5.
95. DSM-IV at 527. Pedophilia involves recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies,
sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or children which
cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas
of functioning, conducted by an individual at least 16 years of age, who is at least five years older
than the child or children. DSM-IV at 528.
96. Id. at 530. Sexual sadism involves recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual
urges, or behaviors, involving acts (real, not simulated) in which the psychological or physical
suffering (including humiliation) of the victim is sexually exciting to the person and which causes
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of
functioning of the abuser.
97. Although Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified: Rape, is not specifically included within
the DSM-IV, it is widely recognized by experts in the treatment and assessment of sex offenders.
WATSA Brief at 5 (citing Abel & Rouleau, The Nature & Extent of Sexual Assault, in
HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: ISSUES AND TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDERS, at 18 n.2
(William L. Marshall et al. eds., 1990)).
98. Memo of Authorities in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 27,
Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (No. C94-480C) [hereinafter State's
Brief].
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Dr. Gene Abel, a leader in the field of sexual pathology, has
suggested two reasons why uncontrollable rape is not included in the
DSM-IV.9 9  Dr. Abel suggests that psychiatry has had "limited
contact with the more aggressive sex offenders, and as a consequence,
less information has been available regarding sexual aggressiveness as
compared to the less aggressive paraphiliacs."' '°  Second, Dr. Abel
argues that leaders in the psychiatric profession are unwilling to
characterize sexual misbehaviors such as rape as a psychiatric condition
for fear that such a characterization could be used as an excuse for
escaping punishment. 1 The task force that was convened to revise
the DSM-III actually concluded that the weight of scientific evidence
supported the inclusion of rape as a paraphilia known as "paraphiliac
coercive disorder."' 12 That category is intended only for individuals
with an intense, repetitive urge to commit rape, who had either acted
on their urge or were otherwise disturbed by the urge.'03  The
recommendation to include rape in the "paraphiliac coercive disorder"
category was disapproved by the Board of Directors of the American
Psychiatric Association. 0 4  According to Dr. Abel, the behavior of
certain rapists fits logically within the general rationale of paraphilia
because rapists report having recurrent, repetitive, and compulsive
urges and fantasies to commit rape.'
Contrary to the findings of the federal district court, the term
mental abnormality does have a recognized meaning to psychiatric and
psychological clinicians who can testify in good faith to the presence
of a mental abnormality and identify real and meaningful sexual
pathologies.
Unlike "mental abnormality," "personality disorder" does have a
clinically recognized definition in the DSM-IV. °6  A personality
disorder occurs when personality traits are inflexible, maladaptive, and
cause significant functional impairment or subjective distress. 7 In
99. See Abel & Rouleau, supra note 97, at 18 n.2.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality & Morality of Civilly Committing Violent
Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 732 (Spring 1992).
103. Gene G. Abel, Paraphilias, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1069,
1079-80 (Harold I. Kaplan et al. eds., 1989).
104. Id.
105. See Abel & Rouleau, supra note 97, at 18.
106. DSM-IV at 629.
107. Id. at 630. The essential feature of a personality disorder is an enduring pattern of
inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's
culture and is manifested in at least two of the following areas: cognition, affectivity, interpersonal
functioning, or impulse control; this enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad
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its brief, the Washington State Psychiatric Association (WSPA)
correctly stated that the DSM-IV describes no personality disorders
peculiar to sex offenders.'08 However, the WSPA further argued that
as a result, "courts can expect efforts to invent such a personality
disorder" and that the manufactured diagnoses will be "entirely
circular."" In other words, a "summary description of X's behavior
will be transformed into its cause."'' There is no reason, however,
to believe that the SVP statute will encourage the "invention" of
disorders.
First, personality disorders are specifically listed in the DSM-IV.
Second, the WSPA failed to reflect all of the elements of the diagnostic
process when it stated that the diagnoses listed in sex predator
evaluations would be circular."' When diagnosing a mental disor-
der, the psychiatrist or psychological clinician posits the existence of a
mental pathology based upon a combination of objective and subjective
data that are then compared and cross-referenced to those diagnostic
criteria established by the profession." 2 That is how sexual disorders
are diagnosed, as well as psychotic disorders, mood disorders, and
cognitive disorders; it is not a circular process." 3
In sum, although mental abnormality does not have a clinical
definition, its statutory definition is recognized by clinicians and
encompasses sexual pathologies contained in the DSM-IV. Personality
disorders do have a clinical definition in the DSM-IV and diagnostic
guidelines therefore already exist. Although there is no personality
disorder specific to sexual predators, the statute does not encourage the
invention of a new disorder. The diagnosis of any mental disorder, be
it a personality disorder or a mental abnormality, involves the
observation of an individual in order to collect data and compare that
data to established diagnostic criteria. Therefore, both personality
disorder and mental abnormality can be said to encompass mental
disorders as defined in the DSM-IV; the Supreme Court's mental
illness component is therefore satisfied. The fact that the term mental
range of personal and social situations and leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational, or other important areas of function; the pattern is stable and of long
duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood; the pattern
is not better accounted for as a manifestation or consequence of another mental disorder and is
not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or a general medical condition. Id.
108. WATSA Brief at 9 (quoting WSPA Brief at 7).
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting WSPA Brief at 7).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 10.
113. Id.
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illness is not used in the SVP statute is irrelevant because the terms
mental disorder and mental illness have been used synonymously by
both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Washington State Supreme
Court in the civil commitment statutory scheme.1 4
2. Mental Illness and Mental Disorder Have Consistently Been
Used Interchangeably
The terms mental illness and mental disorder have been used
interchangeably by the courts and the legislature. Since mental
abnormality encompasses mental disorders as defined in the DSM-IV,
the fact that the term is not commonly found is insignificant. Terms
such as emotional disorder and emotionally disturbed are used
synonymously with mentally ill and mentally disordered. Mental
abnormality is just another term used to describe a type of mental
disorder.
In order to understand the Supreme Court's prohibition against
the civil commitment of an individual unless shown to be both
mentally ill and dangerous, one must examine how the U.S. Supreme
Court has historically used the term. The mentally ill requirement was
first expressed in Addington v. Texas."' The issue in Addington was
what standard of proof procedural due process required before a person
could be involuntarily civilly committed." 6  Because all parties
conceded that Addington was mentally ill,"' the Court neither
discussed nor attempted to define what was meant by mental illness.
However, the Court used the terms mental illness, mental disorder,
mental disease, emotional disorder, and emotionally disturbed
interchangeably throughout the opinion. For example, in describing
the State's interest, the Court wrote:
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers
in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its
police power to protect the community from the dangerous
tendencies of some who are mentally ill . . . . The expanding
concern of society with problems of mental disorders is reflected in
the fact that in recent years many states have enacted statutes
designed to protect the rights of the mentally ill. 118
114. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
115. Brief of Appellant at 12, Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995),
appeal docketed, No. 95-35958 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Addington, 441 U.S. 426).
116. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 418).
117. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 420).
118. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (emphasis added)).
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In Allen v. Illinois,"9 the Supreme Court continued to use the
terms interchangeably. In Allen, the Court considered whether Illinois'
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act was criminal or civil in nature.
12
The statute at issue, like Washington's SVP statute, used the term
mental disorder rather than mental illness.' In its opinion, howev-
er, the Court used the term mentally ill, thus suggesting that the
distinction was more semantic than substantive. 22 In discussing the
statute's requirement that a petition may not be brought for commit-
ment unless the person it seeks to commit has perpetrated at least one
act of sexual predatory violence, the Court stated that just because "the
State has chosen not to apply the Act to the larger class of mentally ill
persons who might be found sexually dangerous does not somehow
transform a civil proceeding into a criminal one. "123 Again, although
the statute at issue used the term mental disorder, the Court used the
term mentally ill.
In Washington v. Harper,24 the U.S. Supreme Court again made
no distinction between the terms mental illness and mental disor-
der.' 25 In Harper, the Court held that a statute permitting the state
to administer antipsychotic drugs to prisoners who suffered from a
mental disorder did not violate substantive due process. 26 Through-
out the opinion, the Court referred to the treatment of the mentally
ill.' 27
The Washington Legislature also consistently uses the terms
mental illness and mental disorder interchangeably. 28  Washington's
civil commitment statute121 is found under Title 71, "Mental Ill-
ness." However, the term mental illness does not appear once in the
statute! Instead, the term mental disorder is used throughout. 30
Civil commitment under Washington's legislative scheme has been
119. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
120. Id. at 365.
121. Id. at 365 n.1.
122. Id. at 370.
123. Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
124. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
125. Brief of Appellant at 13.
126. Id. (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 236).
127. Id. at 14 (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 213).
128. Brief of Appellant at 14.
129. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.010-.940 (1994).
130. Brief of Appellant at 14 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.010-.940 (1994)).
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consistently upheld as constitutional, despite the use of the term mental
disorder.'31
Opponents of the SVP statute argue that regardless of whether
mental disorder is used synonymously with mental illness, the
legislative findings disavow the notion that individuals committed
under the SVP are mentally ill. However, in finding "that a small but
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exists who do
not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for
the existing involuntary treatment act,' 1 32 the Legislature was not
stating that sexually violent predators do not have a mental disorder.
Rather, the Legislature was indicating that sexually violent predators
have a type of mental disorder that is not appropriate for "existing
involuntary treatment" facilities. 133 In other words, the intent of the
SVP statute is to provide a new kind of treatment and facility for a
type of mental disorder that is not amenable to the "existing"
involuntary commitment scheme. The federal district court's
misreading of the legislative findings is a glaring and fundamental
weakness in its argument.
Because mental illness and mental disorder have been used
interchangeably not only by the U.S. Supreme Court, which set the
substantive due process standard for civil commitment, but also by the
state legislature and other authorities, the fact that Washington's
statute does not contain the term mental illness is irrelevant. 34
The prohibition against involuntarily committing individuals who
do not suffer from a mental illness or disorder is meant to prevent the
state from exercising its police and parens patriae powers too broadly
131. See, e.g., Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1983); State v. Saffron, 146 Wash.
202, 262 P. 970 (1927); In re La Belle, 107 Wash. 2d 196, 728 P.2d 138 (1986); In re Detention
of R.S., 124 Wash. 2d 766, 881 P.2d 972 (1994).
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (1994) (emphasis added).
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (1994). In arguing that the Legislature was saying
that sexually violent predators "do not have a mental disease or defect," the opponents have taken
the statement out of context. The statement must be read with the rest of the clause attached.
Thus, it reads "who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for the
existing involuntariy treatment act." Therefore, it becomes dear that the meaning meant by the
Legislature is that sexually violent predators do have a mental disease or defect but it is not the
type of mental disease or defect that can be appropriately handled by the existing involuntary
treatment act.
134. If the debate is truly one of semantics, the Legislature could easily amend the language
of the statute to "mental disorder" and avoid further controversy. However, any change in the
commitment guidelines would require the State to reinitiate proceedings against all of the
predators currently committed, involving an inordinate amount of time and expense.
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and taking away the liberty of individuals before a need has been
demonstrated. 3 ' The SVP statute serves this goal.
3. The Purpose of the Mental Illness/Mental Disorder
Requirement is Served by the SVP Statute
The U.S. Supreme Court's insistence on a mental illness require-
ment in civil commitment proceedings was meant to protect the
fundamental liberty interest of the individual and only deprive an
individual of such an interest when necessary to protect the commu-
nity.'36 In other words, the Court sought to prevent the mass
commitment of individuals based on improperly drawn and overly
broad statutes. Although the Court insisted on a finding of mental
disorder, it recognized that "the subtleties and nuances of psychiatric
diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situa-
tions."' 37 The Court held that "states must be free to develop a
variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common
uniform mold.., the substantive standards for civil commitment may
vary from state to state."'38
However, despite the cries from opponents, the mental abnormal-
ity and personality disorder requirements of the statute do not in fact
provide "criterion so elastic that it can be stretched to fit all sex
offenders."' 39 In the first three years of the SVP statute's existence,
2,131 adult sex offenders and 650 juvenile sex offenders were released
from prison; of the 2,781 sex offenders released, only 14 were tried and
committed as sexually violent predators. 4 These statistics support
the argument made by the Washington Association for the Treatment
of Sexual Abusers in its amicus brief that sexually violent predators
constitute a small number of dangerous offenders suffering from
identifiable sexual pathologies who are likely to reoffend.' 4' If the
criterion used by the SVP statute was "elastic" or "vague," as argued
by the WSPA, higher numbers of commitments would be expected.
Instead, in the SVP statute's first three years, less than one-half of one
135. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 430.
138. Id. at 431.
139. WSPA Brief at 6.
140. Nine others were awaiting trial. Exhibit C to Respondent's Response to Petitioner's
Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply to Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (No. C94-480C),
[hereinafter State's Brief II].
141. WATSA Brief at 11-12.
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percent of all sexual offenders released into the community were
diagnosed and committed as sexually violent predators.142
In Foucha,'43 the U.S. Supreme Court set specific standards for
civil commitment statutes.14 4  The opponents claim that the SVP
statute is unconstitutional under the Foucha standards. However, the
SVP statute meets the standards as set by the Supreme Court in
Foucha v. Louisiana. 145
4. The SVP Statute Meets the Standards of Foucha v. Louisiana
In Foucha, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
Louisiana statute that allowed civil commitment of an individual found
not guilty by reason of insanity unless the individual could prove that
he was not dangerous.1 46  The federal district court held that Foucha
renders Washington's SVP statute unconstitutional. This argument is
without merit.
The Foucha statute allowed the state to detain an insanity
acquittee as long as he was dangerous, even if he did not suffer from
any mental illness.' 47  The civil commitment statute in Foucha had
no mental illness component whatsoever. In contrast, the SVP statute in
Washington requires that an individual be diagnosed with either a
mental abnormality or a personality disorder.14  Civil commitment
is allowed only for a certain narrowly defined group of persons who are
defined by the statute as "sexually violent predators."' 49
Another argument raised before the district court was that Foucha
holds that an antisocial personality disorder is not a form of mental
illness,' and, therefore, the SVP statute's requirement of a personal-
ity disorder is unconstitutional. However, the question of whether an
"antisocial personality" or an antisocial personality disorder constitutes
a form of mental illness was not before the Court in Foucha."' The
142. State's Brief II, Exhibit C (2131 adult sex offenders were released; 650 juvenile sex
offenders were released; only 14 were tried and committed as sexually violent predators).
143. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
144. Id. at 78-80. The Foucha court required that a civil commitment statute both contain
a mental illness component and be narrowly drawn. Id.
145. 504 U.S. 71.
146. Id. at 83.
147. Id. at 78.
148. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010, 71.09.020 (1994).
149. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020 (1994).
150. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Support of a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Motion for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to State's Motion
for Summary Judgment at 74, Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (No.
C94-480C) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
151. State's Brief II at 23; see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 71.
1996]
Seattle University Law Review
State never contended that Foucha was mentally ill at the time of the
hearing because the State was operating under a statute that did not
require a finding of mental illness.'5 2  The Foucha Court never
addressed this issue. The only question before the Court in Foucha
was whether a civil commitment statute that contained no requirement
of mental illness was constitutional. In addition, it is not clear from
the Foucha opinion that Foucha was ever diagnosed with an antisocial
personality disorder.
As further support that Foucha was only intended to address
statutes that contained no mental illness component, Justice O'Connor,
in her concurrence, explicitly states that "this case does not require us
to pass judgment on more narrowly drawn laws .... ",153 The SVP
statute is just the kind of narrowly drawn law to which Justice
O'Connor was referring.'5 4 The requirements of Foucha, that a civil
commitment statute both contain a mental illness component and be
narrowly drawn, are satisfied by Washington's SVP statute.
B. Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy'55
The Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses apply to criminal
matters and, therefore, if a statute is civil it cannot violate either
clause."5 6 The exception to this rule is that if a civil statute is
punitive in impact, it would also be subject to the Ex Post Facto and
Double Jeopardy Clauses.5 7 Therefore, if a statute is held to be civil
in intent and is not punitive in impact, the Double Jeopardy and Ex
Post Facto clauses are not implicated.
In determining whether the SVP statute is civil or criminal, the
first issue is whether the Legislature, in establishing the statute,
indicated a preference for either a civil or criminal label. If the
Legislature indicated an intent to establish a civil statute, the question
is whether the statutory scheme is so punitive as to negate that
intention.' In enacting the SVP statute, the Legislature intended
to create a civil statute and the effect of the statute is not so punitive
152. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 71.
153. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 38, 857 P.2d at 1007.
155. Ex post facto and double jeopardy are two separate constitutional issues. However,
because the SVP statute is civil in both intent and impact, the threshold requirement for applying
double jeopardy and ex post facto-that a statute be punitive in either intent or impact-is never
met. Therefore, the substantive definition of the two clauses need never be addressed.
156. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 18, 857 P.2d at 996 (emphasis added); see also supra Part
II.A. (discussing ex post facto and double jeopardy).
157. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
158. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 18, 857 P.2d at 996.
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as to make the statute criminal." 9 Therefore, the SVP statute does
not implicate, let alone violate, the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
1. The Legislature Intended to Create a Civil Statute
The federal district court, which held the SVP statute violatives
the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses, focused mainly on
the impact of the statute rather than the legislative intent.60 In
briefs to the court, the petitioners addressed the legislative intent and
argued that the intent was clearly to create a punitive statute rather
than a civil statute.' The weaknesses in this argument are demon-
strated by examining the language of the statute and the legislative
history, which reveal a clear intent to create a civil statutory scheme.
First, as noted by the Washington Supreme Court, the SVP
statute is entitled "Civil Commitment" and is codified under Title 71,
Mental Illness.'62 The residents committed under the SVP statute
are housed at a Department of Social and Health Services treatment
center.163 The Department of Corrections has absolutely no role in
caring for the committed sex predators.'t 4 Lastly, the language and
provisions of the SVP statute are very similar to those of Washington's
civil involuntary commitment act. 61
The Legislature's final report refers to "Civil Commitment," and
reports that "[a] new civil commitment procedure is created for
'sexually violent predators. '"'166 The Legislature enacted a bill almost
identical to that proposed by the Governor's Task Force and the Task
Force clearly recommended a civil law because neither the criminal
system nor the existing civil system could accommodate the special
needs of sex predators. 67
The petitioner argued, and the federal district court agreed, that
the Legislature intended the statute to be criminal in nature because
the Legislature admitted in its findings that there is no appropriate
treatment available for sexually violent predators. 6 ' But the Legisla-
159. Id. at 19, 857 P.2d at 996.
160. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 751-752.
161. See Petitioner's Brief at 44-61.
162. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 19, 857 P.2d at 996.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05 (1994).
166. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 19, 857 P.2d at 996 (quoting 1990 Final Legislative
Report, 2nd SSB 6259, at 144).
167. Id. (quoting Task Force Report, at 11-20 through 11-23).
168. See Petitioner's Brief at 41.
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ture created the SVP statute precisely because there did not exist
current involuntary treatment facilities capable of providing effective
treatment for sexually violent predators. 69 The SVP statute sets up
a system to provide effective treatment and promote the traditional
goals of a civil commitment.
The petitioner further argued in district court that the Legislature
did not intend treatment since the statute requires an individual to
have been convicted of or charged with a crime prior to being
committed under the statute. 70  In most cases, furthermore, the
individual has already served time for the crime.' 7 ' Criminally
punishing an individual for a crime prior to civilly committing him
does not transform a civil commitment statute into a criminal one.
Each proceeding stands on its own merits. A state may both crimi-
nally and civilly commit an individual, without nullifying the civil
aspect of the civil commitment statute.172
Finally, the petitioner argued that the civil language of the statute
merely hides its true intent because the SVP statute was primarily a
response to public outcry following two brutal sex crimes. 73  How-
ever, "the fact that the new legislation followed hard upon a shocking
event that resulted in a great public outcry should not be taken as per
se criticism of the legislation. Shocking events can generate beneficial
responses, not only hysterical, ill thought-out ones. As demon-
strated by the statements made prior to forming the Governor's task
force which created the SVP statute, the Governor and other legislators
wanted a well-thought out solution to the problem of sexually violent
predators. 17
The statutory language and the legislative history of the SVP
statute demonstrates that the intent of the Legislature was to create a
civil statutory scheme. Once it has been found that the Legislature
169. WAsH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (1994).
170. Petitioner's Brief at 44-45.
171. Id.
172. See Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1991).
173. State's Brief II at 7.
174. Id. (quoting Alexander D. Brooks, "The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly
Committing Violent Sexual Predators," 15 U. OF PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 712 (Spring
1992)).
175. The Governor stated, "We want a solution that is not just window dressing." In
addition, Rep. Marlin Appelwick, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, in an article in the
Tacoma News Tribune on June 2, 1989, urged a slow, deliberate approach to the problem. On
June 25, Senate Majority Leader Jeannette Hayner was quoted by the Tacoma News Tribune as
commenting that, "You don't rush out there and do anything without careful consideration.
We're not China." State's Brief at 8 (citing from David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the
Act and In the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 525, 537 (Spring 1992)).
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intended the SVP statute to be civil, the statute must be examined to
determine if its impact is so punitive that its civil intent is negated.
2. The Impact of the SVP Statute is Civil Rather Than Punitive
Two lines of analysis can be performed to determine whether the
punitive effect of the SVP statute negates its civil intent. First, the
SVP statute can be compared to a sexually violent predator statute that
has been upheld by the Supreme Court as civil.' 76 Second, the
factors set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court for determining whether
a statute is criminal can be held up against the SVP statute. 7 ' The
federal district court held that the SVP statute is punitive in impact
and therefore violates both the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the United States Constitution.17 However, as demon-
strated below, both forms of analysis paint the SVP statute as clearly
civil in impact.
a. Allen v. Illinois: A Sexually Violent Predator
Statute Upheld as Civil
In Allen v. Illinois, Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act
(Illinois Act) was held to be civil in nature.'79 The Illinois Act
allows for the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons, defined
as
[a]ll persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder
has existed for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior
to the filing of the petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with
criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and who
have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts
of sexual molestation of children."8'
Under the Illinois Act, the state has an obligation to provide "care and
treatment [for persons adjudged sexually dangerous] designed to effect
recovery."'' 1  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the state has
established a system "under which committed persons may be released
after the briefest time in confinement."' 82  The Court held the
Illinois Act to be civil in nature, stating that the "State has disavowed
176. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
177. See Kennedy, 372 U.S 144.
178. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 754.
179. Allen, 478 U.S. at 364.
180. Id. at 366; ILL. ANN. STAT. § ch. 38, 105-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
181. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369.
182. Id. at 370.
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any interest in punishment and provided for the treatment of those it
commits."' 83
Washington's SVP statute is almost identical to the Illinois Act.
Illinois' definition of a sexually dangerous person is virtually the same
as the SVP's definition of a "sexually violent predator"-both require
a mental disorder that leads to the commission of violent sex
offenses.184 Both statutes require examination by a qualified psychia-
trist and a trial with proof beyond a reasonable doubt to determine if
the individual should be committed..8 Both statutes provide for the
care and treatment of the committed individual.186 Both statutes
require the release of the individual when he or she is no longer
deemed to be mentally disordered and dangerous.'87 A final and
183. Id.
184. Washington's statute defines a sexually violent predator as "any person who has been
convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). The Illinois
Act defines "sexually dangerous person" as "all persons suffering from a mental disorder, which
mental disorder has existed for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing
of the petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities toward acts of sexual
assault or acts of sexual molestation of children." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, 1 205/1.01 (Smith-
Hurd 1993) (emphasis added).
185. A hearing is held to determine if probable cause exists that an individual is a sexually
violent predator; if probable cause is found, a trial is held within 45 days in which a jury must
unanimously decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is a sexually violent predator.
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.040-.050 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
After filing of the petition, the court shall appoint two qualified psychiatrists to examine
the alleged sexually dangerous person to decide whether such person is sexually
dangerous; the respondent has a right to demand trial by jury and to be represented by
counsel; the burden of proof required to commit a defendant to confinement as a
sexually dangerous person is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 725, 205/3.01, 4, 4.01, 5 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
186. Any person committed has the right to adequate care and individualized treatment.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080 (Supp. 1995). The Director of Corrections shall provide care and
treatment for the person committed to him designed to effect recovery. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725,
205/8 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
187. If the secretary determines the person's mental abnormality has so changed that the
person is not likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, the secretary will serve a
petition on the court and the court will order a hearing in which the burden is on the prosecutor
to show beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner is not safe to be at large; petitioner may also
petition without the secretary's approval annually. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(1) (Supp.
1995). An application in writing setting forth facts showing that the sexually dangerous person
has recovered may be filed with the court at any time; the court shall set a hearing; if the patient
is found to no longer be dangerous the court will order a discharge; the burden lies with the
petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer sexually dangerous.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, 205/9 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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important similarity is that both statutes are contingent on the
commission, or attempt to commit, a sexual crime.'
Opponents of Washington's SVP statute argue that because the
statute is contingent on a criminal charge, its impact is punitive.
However, the Illinois statute is also contingent on a criminal act yet the
Allen Court concluded that just because the "State has chosen not to
apply the Act to the larger class of mentally ill persons [those that have
not had a criminal charge] does not somehow transform a civil
proceeding into a criminal one."' 89
Opponents of the SVP statute attempt to distinguish Allen on the
ground that the Illinois Act provides for treatment in lieu of punish-
ment. In its discussion of the civil nature of the Illinois Act, however,
nowhere does the Court express that the absence of initial punishment
contributed to its holding. In fact, even though the Illinois Act is
contingent on a criminal act (or the attempt of one), the Court held
that the state has "disavowed any interest in punishment."' 90
Because the Illinois Act provides for treatment in lieu of punishment,
the Court had no cause to discuss whether a statute allowing civil
commitment in addition to incarceration would change its finding that
the Illinois statute is civil. The court did not, however, state that the"in lieu of" component was determinative of the civil finding.
Therefore, although the opponents of the SVP statute are correct in
stating that the Washington and Illinois statutes differ in this respect,
they are incorrect in making the assumption that this distinction was
dispositive.
Other factors examined by the U.S. Supreme Court in determin-
ing whether a statute is civil or criminal in impact were set forth in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.'9'
b. The Factors Set Forth in Kennedy Support the Civil Impact of the
SVP Statute
In Kennedy, the Supreme Court laid out seven factors to determine
whether a statute is punitive or regulatory: (1) whether the sanction
188. The Washington statute applies to any person who has been convicted of or charged
with a sexual crime. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020 (Supp. 1995). The Illinois statute applies
to all persons . . . who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of
sexual molestation of children. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, 1 205/1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Proof
of "propensity" under the Illinois Act requires that the state prove the defendant has
demonstrated propensity through at least one act of or attempt at sexual assault or sexual
molestation. People v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d 690 (11.), aff'd, 478 U.S. 364 (1985).
189. Allen, 478 U.S. at 370.
190. Id. at 369.
191. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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involves affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has histori-
cally been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether an initial finding of
scienter is required; (4) whether its operation will promote traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned. 192 The task of a court in determining
whether a statute is punitive or regulatory is not simply to count the
factors on each side, but to weigh them.193
In holding that the SVP statute was punitive in impact, the federal
district only discussed three of the Kennedy factors: (1) whether the
sanction involves affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime; and (3) whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence.194 Interestingly enough, these same factors from
Kennedy were cited by the Washington State Supreme Court in holding
that the statute was not punitive in impact.195 In order to show that
the statutory scheme is so punitive that it negates the legislature's civil
intent, a litigant must provide the "clearest proof."''9 The argu-
ments made by the petitioners and the holding of the federal district
court are not supported by such a standard of proof.
i. Whether the Sanction Involves Affirmative Restraint
The SVP statute does subject individuals to affirmative restraint.
Individuals are held in a treatment facility until no longer mentally
disordered or dangerous. However, all civil commitment statutes
involve affirmative restraint, including the general involuntary civil
commitment statutes that are no longer questioned on constitutional
grounds. Affirmative restraint in the civil commitment setting is not
considered punitive because its goals are incapacitation and treatment,
which historically have been considered different from the criminal
incarceration goals of retribution and deterrence.19
192. 372 U.S. at 168-169.
193. State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992).
194. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 752.
195. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 21, 857 P.2d at 998.
196. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
197. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 22-23, 857 P.2d at 998-999.
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In Director v. Daniels,98 the Maryland Supreme Court conclud-
ed that Maryland's Defective Delinquents Act (Act)' 99 was civil in
light of the Kennedy factors. The Act defined a defective delinquent
as
an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated
antisocial or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward
criminal activity, and who is found to have either such intellectual
deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstrate
an actual danger to society so as to require such confinement and
treatment, when appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe for
society to terminate the confinement and treatment."'
The remainder of the Act provides, in essence, that persons convicted
of specified offenses may be thereafter tried as defective delinquents
and if found to be such may be confined for an indeterminate
period.2' The similarity of the Maryland Act to Washington's SVP
statute makes the Maryland's court's analysis of the Kennedy factors
helpful in analyzing the SVP statute.20 2 In determining that the Act
was not punitive under the affirmative restraint factor, the Daniels
court held that
even though the sanction does involve an affirmative restraint, it is
provided only because it is deemed best for the protection and
treatment of society and best for the protection and treatment of the
individual that he be placed in a maximum security institution
maintained solely for defective delinquents and not for other
members of the criminal element.20 3
Similarly, the affirmative restraint of the SVP statute is done merely as
a means to protect society as well as treat the mentally disordered
individual.
The federal district court held that the reason the affirmative
restraint is punitive is that it entails a complete loss of freedom for an
198. 221 A.2d 397 (Md. 1966).
199. Although the Defective Delinquents Act was later amended by the Maryland
legislature in 1977, it was never found to be unconstitutional. See Gluckstern v. Sutton, 574 A.2d
898, 901 (Md. 1990).
200. SAS v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 510 (4th Cir. 1962).
201. Daniels, 221 A.2d at 410.
202. Although the Maryland Act differs from Washington's SVP statute in that it pertains
to juveniles, nowhere in the Maryland Supreme Court's decision does the court state that the
young age of the committed delinquents was relevant to their holding that the statute was
constitutional. See Daniels, 221 A.2d 397.
203. Daniels, 221 A.2d at 410.
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indefinite amount of time. 2' The court stated that the reason the
Allen Court held a similar statute to be civil is that the Illinois Act
differs from Washington's SVP statute in two substantial ways: (1) It
provides for case review every six months, as opposed to Washington's
reviews every twelve months, and (2) the committed person is free to
apply for release at anytime in Illinois, whereas in Washington, they
may apply only once a year.2 °5 First, there is no indication in the
Allen opinion that reviews once a year rather than twice a year would
make a civil statute punitive.0 6 Second, although Washington's SVP
statute only allows individuals to petition for release once a year,
Washington's SVP statute's burden of persuasion and standard of
proof differ markedly. In Illinois, although the individual may petition
for release at any time, the burden of persuasion remains at all times
on the petitioner.°7 In contrast, under Washington's SVP statute,
once probable cause is found that the individual is no longer a sexually
violent predator, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the individual is still a sexually violent preda-
tor.208
Therefore, since the duration of commitment is directly related to
the purposes for which an individual is committed-to obtain
treatment-the affirmative restraint serves the civil commitment goals
of incapacitation and treatment.
ii. Whether the Behavior to Which it Applies is Already a Crime
The federal district court held that the SVP statute applies to
behavior that is already criminal and is "expressly limited in its
application to persons who have been convicted of a crime or who have
been charged with a crime but found incompetent to stand trial or
found not guilty by reason of insanity. ' 209 Although the federal
204. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 752.
205. Id. at 753.
206. In fact, the Court brought up the 6-month case review in a footnote pertaining to the
state's obligation to provide care and treatment designed to effect recovery, not as a comment on
affirmative restraint. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369.
207. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, 205/9 (Smith-Hurd 1993); see also People v. Rogers, 574
N.E.2d 1374 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (Defendant has burden of showing by preponderance of the
evidence that he is no longer sexually dangerous); People v. Cooper, 557 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990).
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(1) (Supp. 1995) ("The burden of proof shall be upon
the prosecuting attorney or attorney general to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
petitioner's mental abnormality or personality disorder remains such that the petitioner is not safe
to be at large ... ").
209. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 752.
[Vol. 20:157
Sexually Violent Predator Statute
district court is correct that the definition of "sexually violent predator"
requires that the individual have been convicted of or charged with a
sexual offense, the behavior to which the statute applies is the mental
abnormality or personality disorder. This requires no finding of
culpability but merely that the individual suffer from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes him likely to engage in
acts of sexual violence. The fact that in addition to the mental
disorder, the individual must also have been convicted or charged with
a sexual crime serves to narrow the scope of the statute, not render it
criminal. The SVP statute focuses on treating individuals for a current
mental disorder that renders them dangerous; the focus is not on
locking them up because they once committed a crime. Individuals are
not committed under the SVP statute because they have committed a
crime; they are committed because they have a mental abnormality or
personality disorder at the time of the commitment proceedings.
iii. Whether Operation of the SVP Statute Will Promote the
Traditional Aims of Punishment-Retribution and Deterrence
The SVP statute was enacted to protect society and treat the
mentally disordered sexually violent predator. One effect of commit-
ting individuals is that they are deterred from carrying out their
behavior on the general public. This effect is found in the general civil
commitment laws as well because those individuals are also confined
and unable to carry out activity that would be harmful to themselves
or others. Therefore, the SVP statute does have a deterrent effect.
However, because it is aimed at treatment, it is not retributive.
The federal district court found that the SVP statute promotes
retribution and deterrence by requiring a convicted sex offender to
serve his sentence prior to commitment.21° The court stated that the
Illinois Act in Allen was civil because it provided treatment in lieu of
punishment.21' However, the Allen Court held the Illinois Act civil
not because it provided treatment in lieu of punishment, but because
of how it proceeded to provide treatment."2 The issue of whether
the Act would have been constitutional had it allowed punishment
prior to commitment was never addressed by the Allen Court. The
Court stated that Illinois' decision to commit only individuals who had
been charged with a sexual crime did not make the commitment statute
210. Id. at 752.
211. Id.
212. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369-70.
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per se criminal.213 Using the same reasoning, Washington's decision
to allow the commitment of individuals who have been previously
incarcerated does not render its civil commitment statute criminal.
Instead, the SVP statute promotes the civil commitment goals of
incapacitation and treatment.
In addition, the federal district court states that the SVP statute
"forecloses the possibility that offenders will be evaluated and treated
until after they have been punished .... the failure of the Statute to
provide for examination or treatment prior to the completion of the
punishment phase strongly suggests that treatment is of secondary,
rather than primary, concern." 214  The court is incorrect in its
suggestion that the SVP statute prevents offenders from receiving
treatment until after they have been punished and that the state has no
interest in treatment prior to the completion of punishment.
First, the SVP statute, which civilly commits individuals
determined to have a current mental abnormality and personality
disorder, has nothing to do with whether that individual was able to
receive treatment before being committed. As with any civil commit-
ment statute, including Washington's involuntary civil commitment
act, an individual is always free to get treatment independently.215
Second, Washington's interest in treating sex offenders is not a recent
development. On the contrary, Washington has one of the largest
prison-based treatment programs for sexual offenders in the coun-
try,216 which existed long before the SVP statute. The Sexual
Offender Treatment Program at the Twin Rivers Correction Center
provides 200 beds for sex offenders desiring treatment.217  When
convicted of a sexual offense, individuals expressing an interest in
treatment are added to a waiting list.2 18  As vacancies occur, individ-
uals are transferred to Twin Rivers to participate in the treatment
program.219 When an individual has "absorbed and mastered as
213. Id. at 370.
214. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 753.
215. See infra notes 216-220 and accompanying text for discussion on treatment
opportunities available for sexual offenders while in prison.
216. See TWIN RIVERS CORRECTION CENTER, TWIN RIVERS CORRECTIONS CENTER SEX
OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAM, PROGRAM OVERVIEW (1994) [hereinafter SOTP
OVERVIEW] (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
217. Id.
218. It seems reasonable to assume that the length of time served in prison by the
individuals currently committed as sexually violent predators would have been more than enough
for them to have made it into the Twin Rivers Program after being placed on the waiting list had
they so desired.
219. The treatment program consists of group and individual treatments. SOTP
OVERVIEW, supra note 216.
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much of the relevant knowledge, skills and abilities as he is able," his
treatment is considered complete.22 Finally, the Governor's Task
Force additionally made two recommendations regarding improving
treatment facilities in prison.221 Therefore, contrary to the federal
district court's assertion that the SVP statute prevents treatment prior
to completion of punishment and that the state clearly has no interest
in treatment, Washington continues to perfect and improve upon its
prison-based treatment programs concurrent with the operation of the
SVP statute.222
Although the federal district court limited its holding to the above
three Kennedy factors, analysis of the remaining four factors lends
further support to the conclusion that the SVP statute is civil in
impact.
iv. Whether the Statute's Purpose Historically Has Been Regarded
as a Punishment
In analyzing the Defective Delinquents Act in Maryland, the
court held that "this type of sanction or restraint . . . has not been
regarded as punishment but regulatory and is more akin to those laws
consistently held to be civil in nature .... Also this is true of laws
involving loss of liberty by restraint of many mentally ill persons in
mental hospitals in all of the states." '223 The SVP statute provides for
civil commitment of sexually violent predators. In general, civil
commitment for the treatment of the mentally ill or disordered has not
been considered punitive in impact.224 After all, the involuntary
commitment of the mentally disordered is labeled as "civil" commit-
ment. Therefore, committing an individual who has been determined
to be a sexually violent predator is civil regardless of whether the
individual has sometime in the past committed a criminal act.
220. Id. The SOTP recognizes that successful treatment is an ongoing process that will
continue for years beyond the Twin Rivers Correction Center. Id.
221. The Task Force recommended that the beds at Twin Rivers be increased from 200
to 400 and that WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.120(7)(c) (1994), which prevented individuals serving
sentences longer than six years from receiving treatment, be amended. FINAL REPORT OF TASK
FORCE, 11-15 through 11-16 (on file with the Seattle University Law Review). Although the
increase in beds has not yet been implemented by the Legislature, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.94A.120(7)(c) (1994) was amended to allow those individuals to receive treatment. 1993
Wash. Laws ch. 31, § 3.
222. See generally FINAL REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 221; SOTP OVERVIEW,
supra note 216.
223. Daniels, 221 A.2d at 410.
224. Id.
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v. Whether the Statute Comes into Operation Only on
a Finding of Scienter
This factor analyzes whether or not the statute is activated only
when the individual has "guilty knowledge." The opponents argue
that because scienter is a prerequisite for a conviction and a conviction
is one of the prerequisites for triggering the SVP statute, that scienter
is a prerequisite for triggering the SVP statute. However, the
opponents ignore the fact that although scienter is a requirement to
even be considered a sexually violent predator, it is by no means
dispositve. In Daniels, the court held that the Act does not "come into
play on a finding of 'scienter' because the person involved ... [is]
determined to be a defective delinquent only after an intensive mental
examination. '  Similarly, the SVP statute does not allow commit-
ment of individuals based on a finding of scienter from their previous
crimes. On the contrary, an individual is specifically deemed ineligible
for commitment under the SVP statute absent an intensive psychologi-
cal evaluation and trial. The SVP statute comes into play only if an
individual is deemed both mentally disordered and dangerous. Past
criminal activity is a prerequisite to commitment, but it does not
determine whether or not the individual will be committed. The
individual must still suffer from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. Therefore, the SVP
statute does not come into operation on a finding of scienter, but
comes into play only on a finding of a current mental disorder and
dangerousness.
vi. Whether an Alternative Purpose to Which it May Rationally
Be Connected is Assignable for the Statute
This factor analyzes whether or not the statute has a valid purpose
other than punishment. The Daniels court held that "[t]here exists
alternate purposes which are valid functions of the State as part of its
police power. They are the protection of society, coupled with a
humanitarian attempt to treat, cure and rehabilitate those suffering
from abnormal mental suffering."22 6  The United States Supreme
Court has held that a "state has a legitimate interest under its parens
patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because
of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has
225. Id. at 411.
226. Id.
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authority under its police power to protect the community from the
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill." 227
The purpose of the SVP statute is not to punish but to protect the
community while providing adequate care and appropriate treatment
for those who pose a threat to the community. 2 The SVP statute
is rationally related to those purposes because it commits individuals
who have a mental disorder and are a danger to others so that they
may be treated and so that society may be protected. Therefore, the
SVP statute has a nonpunitive purpose.
vii. Whether the Sanctions Appear Excessive in Relation to the
Alternative Purpose Assigned
The Daniels court held that
[t]he sanctions or incarceration provided by the Act are not
excessive in relation to these alternative purposes since most
reputable psychiatrists agree that treatment cannot be related to a
fixed period of confinement, as the length of time necessary for
treatment and cure, if it can be obtained, is uncertain. In addition,
experience has demonstrated that the indeterminate confinement is
itself therapeutic, as it has a tendency to generate and motivate the
individual to participate in the institutional program in order to help
himself.2 9
Similarly, the SVP statute is not excessive in light of the goals it
seeks to accomplish. Sexually violent predators are extremely
dangerous and in order to promote the goal of societal protection, they
must be confined in a high security facility. In addition, in order to
provide adequate treatment, the individuals must be committed until
such time as they are no longer deemed mentally disordered or
dangerous. Finally, the narrow application of the statute lends further
support to the claim that it is far from excessive given the purpose to
which it is assigned (in its first three years, only 14 of the 2,781 sex
offenders released were committed as sexually violent predators).
The legislative intent of the SVP statute, its similarity to the
Illinois Act, and the Kennedy factors all support its standing as a civil
statute in design as well as impact. Therefore, neither the Ex Post
Facto Clause of Article I or the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution are violated.
227. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
228. State's Brief II at 7.
229. Daniels, 221 A.2d at 411.
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Washington's SVP statute does not violate substantive due process
because it furthers a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn.
As required by Addington, the SVP statute requires a finding of both
a mental disorder as well as dangerousness before an individual may be
committed.23 Although Washington's SVP statute is constitutionally
sound, the controversial nature of the law begs the question: "Does a
better alternative to dealing with these sexually violent predators
exist?" The answer, as discussed in the next section, is "No."
V. THE SVP STATUTE IS THE BEST ALTERNATIVE FOR THE
PROBLEM OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
Washington State arrived at the SVP statute through a careful,
deliberative process. In December 1989, the Governor created the
Governor's Task Force on Community Protection consisting of twenty-
four members, including professionals in the criminal justice system,
legislators, treatment professionals, academics, and three victim-
advocates. 231  The Task Force spent approximately six months
creating the SVP statute as well as numerous other recommendations
to assist in community protection.232  Citizens were invited to
participate through twelve public hearings that were held across the
23state. ' Before concluding that the SVP statute was the best alterna-
tive for handling sexually violent predators, the Task Force considered
expansion of the then-existing civil commitment law as well asdeterminate sentencing.234 Opponents of the SVP statute, and even
supporters who fear it will be overturned, have advocated passage of
a "two strikes" law for sexual offenders, similar to Washington's
current "three strikes" law. 23S
230. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020 (1994).
231. Boerner, supra note 8, at 538.
232. The other recommendations made by the Task Force were in the areas of community
treatment for adult sex offenders, prison treatment, polygraph and plethysmograph testing,
juvenile offender treatment, special ex offender disposition alternatives for juveniles, treatment
funds for sexually aggressive youth, crime victims' advocate services, victims' compensation,
school prevention programs, professional training on sexual assault, sex offender registration,
background checks on employees who will be around children, notification programs for victims
and witnesses, law enforcement information, confidentiality statutes and regulations. FINAL
REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 221, I-1 through 11-33.
233. FINAL REPORT OF TASK FORCE, Introductory letter (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
234. See Boemer, supra note 8, at 547-557.
235. In 1990, Washington passed WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.090 (1994), the "three strikes"
law, which provides that any individual convicted of a third felony will be sent to prison for life.
The proposed "two strikes" law would target violent sex offenders and send them to prison for
life after a second rape conviction.
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This Comment next examines each of the proposed alternatives
to the SVP statute and discusses why they are less desirable for
handling sexually violent predators.
A. Expansion of the Involuntary Civil Commitment Law to Provide
for Treatment of Sexually Violent Predators Would Alter that System
in Ways Inconsistent with its Basic Purpose
One proposal considered by the Governor's Task Force was
revision of the general civil commitment laws to provide for the
commitment and treatment of sexually violent predators.236 How-
ever, the Task Force recognized several problems with this
approach.237 First, the existing civil commitment system was work-
ing well for the purposes for which it was designed-the short-term
commitment and treatment of those who are mentally ill. 3 The
field of sex offender treatment, on the other hand, is new and evolving,
requiring special training and treatment.23 9 As the Legislature stated
in the findings to the SVP statute, sexually violent predators as defined
by the statute suffer from a mental disease or defect that cannot be
appropriately handled by the existing involuntary treatment act.240
Second, sexually violent predators pose a heightened security risk
that the existing treatment facilities cannot handle. 4' When Wash-
ington passed a civil commitment law for sexual psychopaths,242 the
lack of security at the commitment facilities led to a series of well-
publicized crimes. 243  This experience demonstrated that sexually
violent predators require special facilities in addition to special
treatment. Additionally, the existing involuntary commitment act is
inadequate to address the risk of recidivism because during confine-
ment sex offenders do not have access to potential victims and
therefore they will not engage in overt acts of sexual violence during
confinement.244  The commitment of sexually violent predators,
236. Boerner, supra note 8, at 547.
237. Id. at 550.
238. Id.
239. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (1994).
240. See id.
241. See Boerner, supra note 8, at 551-52.
242. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06 (1989) (repealed prospectively by 1984 Wash. Laws ch.
209) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989).
243. Boerner, supra note 8, at 552. Among them, in December 1988, was that of Gary
Minnix, who had been committed to Western State Hospital as incompetent to stand trial on four
rape charges. Minnix committed a rape at knife point while at the hospital. The fact that he had
been permitted to leave the hospital on furlough did not reassure the community. Id. at 552 n.46.
244. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (1994).
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therefore, requires different standards for admission, treatment,
continued confinement, and release than those standards utilized under
the current involuntary commitment law. Attempting to expand that
law to provide for the special needs of sexually violent predators would
put an inordinate burden on a system that is already working
effectively. Therefore, the Task Force determined that a separate law
was a better choice.
The passage of a special civil commitment law for sexually violent
predators has led to the creation of a Special Commitment Center that
not only provides an appropriate level of security, but that allows the
residents housed at the Center to receive treatment specifically tailored
to their mental disorders.
B. Mandatory Sentencing Violates the Principle of Proportionality
Another proposal considered by the Task Force was the creation
of a mandatory sentencing system for sex offenders, one in which all
sentences would be for the statutory maximum.245 In other words,
all sex offenders would receive the maximum term regardless of the
character of the offense.
In 1992, Washington enacted the so-called "three strikes" law246
which requires that any individual convicted of a third felony,
regardless of the type, be sentenced to life in prison. The "three
strikes" law encompassed any Class A felony ranging from first degree
murder to possession of a controlled substance. 247  Recently, the
King County Prosecutor proposed enacting a similar "two strikes" law
for sex offenders. 24 Although the bill was passed by the Washing-
ton State Legislature, it was vetoed by the Governor.2 49 The ration-
ale behind the "two strikes" law was that three strikes is "one too
many chances for violent rapists. 20
The problem with mandatory sentencing laws of any type, as
discussed by the Task Force (as well as opponents of the SVP statute),
is that they do not provide punishment specific to an individual's
245. Boemer, supra note 8, at 548.
246. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.090 (1992).
247. Daniel W. Stiller, Washington Voters Go Down Swinging, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 433
(1995).
248. Maleng to Propose "Two Strikes," SEATILE TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995 at B1.
249. The bill was vetoed by the Governor on March 30, 1996. Under the measure, a
person would have been sentenced to life without parole after two convictions of first or second-
degree rape, indecent liberties by force or other felonies found to be sexually motivated. Such
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crime. While everyone might agree that those who commit the most
serious sex offenses deserve very long sentences, not all sex offenders
deserve such sentences."' Mandatory sentencing does not take into
account the fundamental and substantial differences in both culpability
and harm between and among the statutory categories.252
The SVP statute improves upon mandatory sentencing in two
distinct ways. First, the SVP statute is not punitive incarceration.
Under the SVP statute, violent sex offenders who have completed a
term in prison and yet are still mentally disordered and dangerous have
an opportunity to receive treatment and return to society. Second,
unlike mandatory sentencing, which takes no account of the specific
characteristics or disorder of the individual, the SVP statute mandates
an individualized evaluation before determining whether commitment
is necessary. As mentioned above, of the 2,781 sex offenders released
from prison during the first three years of the SVP statute's existence,
only fourteen were tried and committed as sexually violent predators.
It seems likely that had a "two strikes" law been in effect, substantially
more than fourteen not only would have been taken off the streets, but
also would have been sentenced to life in prison.
Even had the Task Force found the general application of
mandatory sentencing tolerable, one major problem existed: mandatory
sentencing could only be applied to crimes committed after the
effective date of the reform because of the constitutional prohibition
against retroactive increases in criminal punishment.5 3 Therefore,
any sexually violent predators currently incarcerated who at the time
of their release were mentally disordered and dangerous, would
nonetheless be released onto the streets and allowed to victimize
another individual before being subject to mandatory sentencing.
C. From the Viewpoint of Both the Sexually Violent Predator and
Society, the S VP Statute is the Best Alternative
Because of the inherent security risks posed by sexually violent
predators, expansion of the existing civil commitment facilities is not
feasible. The only possible alternative to the SVP statute would be
enactment of some form of mandatory sentencing for sex offenders.
Under careful examination, the SVP statute is the best alternative for
the sexually violent predator as well as society.
251. Boerner, supra note 8, at 549.
252. Id. at 550.
253. Id.
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From the point of view of a sexually violent predator, the SVP
statute is preferable to a life term in prison. At least under the SVP
statute, two favorable possibilities exist for a convicted sex offender
that do not exist under mandatory sentencing: the chance to avoid
commitment in the first place if the evaluation does not support the
conclusion that one is a sexually violent predator and, if committed,
the chance to receive treatment and return to society. Individuals
incarcerated prior to enactment of mandatory sentencing would
probably support mandatory sentencing because it would not affect
them. However, this is a short-term view. For a sexually violent
predator, still mentally disordered and dangerous at the end of a prison
term, the likelihood of reoffending is high. Therefore, even if
mandatory sentencing did not have an immediate effect on the sexually
violent predator, it would have an effect as soon as the predator
committed one more sexually violent crime.
Additionally, sentencing all repeat sex offenders to life imprison-
ment would be extremely expensive. Under the SVP statute, only a
small number of sex offenders are committed indefinitely. However,
under a two-strikes law, not only would the state bear the expenses of
the current sex predators who would all be serving life terms, but the
state would also have to bear the expenses for all repeat sex offenders
who are released in large numbers each year.
VI. CONCLUSION
Society must decide on an alternative with which it is comfortable.
Do we want to automatically sentence all sex offenders to life in prison
to avoid even the chance that one of them could get out prematurely
and commit a crime? To avoid even the chance that an Earl
Shriner"s4 could happen again? Or do we want to apply a sentence
that fits the crime and, after completion of that punishment, if the
individual still poses a risk, commit him or her for treatment until he
or she can be safely and successfully returned to society? Each
individual member of society must decide what he or she is most
comfortable with and advocate accordingly. This Comment argues
that the alternative chosen by the Task Force-enactment of the SVP
statute-is not only an appropriate and measured choice to deal with
a complex sociological and legal issue, but is also a constitutional one.
254. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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